Scenes of Subversion: How Monstrous Subjectivities Affect Futurity in Gothic Horror by DiBono, Salvatore S.
Seton Hall University 
eRepository @ Seton Hall 
Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses 
(ETDs) Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses 
Spring 5-20-2021 
Scenes of Subversion: How Monstrous Subjectivities Affect 
Futurity in Gothic Horror 
Salvatore S. DiBono 
Seton Hall University, dibonosa@shu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/dissertations 
 Part of the American Literature Commons, and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
DiBono, Salvatore S., "Scenes of Subversion: How Monstrous Subjectivities Affect Futurity in Gothic 









Scenes of Subversion: How Monstrous Subjectivities Affect Futurity in Gothic Horror  
 
 
Salvatore S. DiBono 
 




Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Master of Arts 
In 
 
The Department of English 
College of Arts and Sciences 






















© Salvatore S. DiBono, May 2021 

























































Seton Hall University  
College of Arts and Sciences 




APPROVAL FOR SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE MASTERS THESIS 
 
 
This Thesis, “Scenes of Subversion: How Monstrous Subjectivities Affect Futurity in Gothic 
Horror,” by Salvatore S. DiBono, has been approved for submission  












        
           
_X__________________________________ 
Russell Sbriglia, PhD, Thesis Advisor 
_X__________________________________ 




      Abstract 
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen begins his conclusory section of his influential essay “Monster 
Culture (Seven Theses)” stating, “Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest 
margins of geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the forbidden 
recesses of our mind, but they always return” (52). Yet, Lee Edelman in No Future: Queer Theory 
and the Death Drive makes a statement which complicates the idea of the monster being “our 
child” when discussing that the normative (conservative) movement will “recurrently frame their 
political struggle…as a ‘fight for our children—for our daughters and our sons,” and thus as a fight 
for the future” (3). How can the monsters be “our children” yet we do not fight for them? What 
does that say for the future in texts that house the monstrous? I believe that Cohen’s position that 
we are the parents that beget the monstrous gives to much credit to the normative culture seeking 
to destroy the monstrous, when the monstrous is so much more than the aberrant spawn of society 
and culture at large. Rather, the monstrous is a radical making of itself; a cell that performs asexual 
reproduction. Therefore, the monstrous has much more agency than merely the oppressed abject. 
The monstrous is a revolutionary subject, a “monstrous subject.” Yet, how do we as readers 
identify what constitutes monstrous subjectivity and when does such a phenomenon occur? In this 
project I define the term “monstrous subjectivity” in conjunction with providing a metric which 
maps the exact point—or rather exact scene—where such a radical act occurs. This scene of radical 
self-birth of the monstrous subject is a term I call the “scene of subversion,” which is where what 
was once meant to be made abject instead resists and rejects this act of hegemonic power this 
making itself a subject outside and in opposition to the normative structure. Yet, what does this 
have to do with futurity? Such a radical act occurring in the archive of the Gothic horror genre 
indicates that it is the monstrous that holds the power over the temporality of the text. The monster 
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can deny a futurity, reject a futurity, or assure a futurity—and this is not an exhaustive list, but 
rather the three I am focusing on. I identify these three variations of how the monstrous subject 
has an affect on futurity in Gothic horror through Edgar Allan Poe’s tale, “The Fall of the House 
of Usher,” Henry James’s novella, The Turn of the Screw, and Toni Morrison’s novel, Beloved. I 
investigate the intersections these texts lay out to find this point of self-birth I call the “scene of 
subversion” as well as underscore the ramifications of such a radical, monstrous act within the 
text—namely to the futurity of the text overall. These scenes of subversion are where the monster 
shows itself to be less a “child” of our making and more so of its own making therefore rejecting 
the concept of the monster as abject and instituting the monster as oppositional and radical subject.      
 
Introduction: What does Horror have to do with the Future? 
The American gothic imaginary is a continuum of monsters who are teaming with meaning 
and the capability to affect a narrative on a fundamental level able to deconstruct and oppose norms 
of American ideology. Discussion of the monstrous is centered on this concept of monster as 
demonstrator of the threat of abjection and the consequences of being abject. For instance, the 
robed monster of M. Night Shyamalan’s The Village forever patrols the border between the 
civilization of the eponymous village and what lays beyond, only for us to learn that the monster 
is a disguise used to scare the village folk from traveling and seeing the modern civilization that 
lays beyond their borders. In his essay “Monster Culture (Seven Thesis)”—an essay wherein he 
works to define what constitutes a monster—Jeffrey Jerome Cohen posits that “the monster is 
difference made flesh, come to dwell among us. In its function as dialectical Other or third-term 
supplement, the monster is an incorporation of the Outside, the Beyond—of all those loci that are 
rhetorically placed as distant and distinct but originate Within” (7). This theoretical maxim of 
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Cohen’s has led to a focus on the monstrous being viewed purely as something aberrant, as 
something abject to (and thus abjected from) the culture that created it. Cohen’s approach to 
monstrosity aims to critique the dominant culture that has created and then cast away the monster. 
However, this focus on the dominant hegemonic culture that creates the monstrous gives 
too much credit to the dominant culture. Such an exclusive focus offers us no real understanding 
of the complex functionality and positionality of the monstrous in relation to the hegemonic 
structure that created it and deemed it as abject. There is a form of subjectivity unique to the 
monstrous which situates the monstrous as being in opposition to the hegemony of the white, 
patriarchal, heterosexual, and capitalistic American ideology. This “monstrous subjectivity is not 
a valorization or fetishization of Otherness, but rather a reimagining of the subject positionality of 
those who are considered monstrous and a giving of power to the monstrous as a form of radical 
resistance to an oppressive hegemonic structure. Instead of viewing the monster as a disguise for 
ideology in order to keep its subjects in line, we should focus on how the monstrous also functions 
as a diametric resistance to dominant ideology, thus becoming a subjectivity that demands to be 
perceived in a context of its own making in response to the dominant culture.  
In order to identify what constitutes a literary figure as possessing or claiming “monstrous 
subjectivity” it is important to first define this term. Most important to this understanding of 
“monstrous subjectivity” is the concept of hegemony originally developed by Antonio Gramsci 
but furthered by the Althusserian theory of ideological state apparatuses. Hegemony is defined as 
a “shorthand to describe the relatively dominant position of a particular set of ideas and their 
associated tendency to become commonsensical and intuitive, thereby inhibiting the dissemination 
or even the articulation of alternative ideas” (Rosemond, Brittanica.com). “Monstrous 
subjectivity” is the realization or the claiming of subjecthood outside of hegemonic—or, more 
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plainly, normative—conceptions of subjecthood. Subjectivity is the possession of a consciousness, 
perspective, experience, and agency, or in plainer terms being in control of one’s own 
individuality. There is also a double move taking place when referring to the subject in the context 
of hegemony, where there is a perceived subjectivity as previously defined, but there is also the 
modality of being a subject. Subjecthood is the passive position of being subjugated or being under 
domination. Therefore, the typical mode of the subject is to be both in control of one’s own 
individualism whilst also being dominated by a hegemonic force in fear of being made abject.  
The concept of the monstrous subject is a reframing of the concept of the abject, a 
positionality Julia Kristeva in “Approaching Abjection” defines as “one of those violent, dark, 
revolts of being directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, 
ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but 
it cannot be assimilated” (95). Reframing the abject as an alternate subject then problematizes the 
position of the entity/structure/ideology that deemed the alternate subject as abject, which is where 
the function of the monstrous in the conceptualization of monstrous subjectivity comes into play. 
This reframing poses the following question: if there is a subjectivity outside the context of the 
dominant hegemony, is there still any power in the fear of abjection for those subject to hegemony? 
This question underscores how the notion of fear of the abject by the subject is a projection of the 
existential fear of loss of power of the hegemonic structure. Therefore, the monstrous subject 
possesses some form of psychic power of resistance in claiming their positionality outside the 
borders of hegemony. However, how does this concept of “monstrous subjectivity” affect ideas of 
futurity in a text? Horror being a subgenre of the wider genre of speculative fiction, the genre 
portrays various ramifications for the act looking towards the future: the future that could have 
existed after the text, and the future that was denied; and all of these different iterations of futurity 
DiBono 5 
 
are affected by an external force and that external force is the monstrous. Well, if the monstrous 
does such a thing, then how, where, and when does the monstrous affect the futurity of the text? 
In addition to addressing these questions, I also look to identify a qualitative metric of horror 
literature that is key to realizing the how, when, and where such a radical, transformative act 
occurs, and I will call this metric the “scene of subversion.” This is the point where the monstrous 
makes itself known as subject and interrupts any attempt or assumption of a “normative” futurity.  
This interruption fully rejects the usual logic of the abject/monstrous being thought of in objective 
terms and instead attributes a subjectivity to the monstrous positionality. These are no longer 
objects being gazed upon, but rather the subjects doing the gazing. 
The project of defining and identifying “monstrous subjectivity” is understanding how such 
a subjectivity functions in enhancing a conceptualization of horror as a radically subversive literary 
genre. Identifying “scene of subversion” begins with a similar project in its goal but focuses on 
where such radical forms of resistance are located and point to a distinct intersection of various 
discourses of radical theoretical traditions of resistance. Louis Althusser’s concept of ideological 
state apparatuses (ISAs) is imperative to understanding how power operates and how power seeks 
to assure its futurity by reproducing the means to reproduce itself and the process by which this 
takes place is interpollation. This concept of a futurity, or rather a reproductive futurity, is doubled 
down on in Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, in which Edelman 
defines queerness as an oppositional stance to the conservative ideological structure of 
reproductive futurity, such that “fighting for the children” as conservatives love to spew is an 
ideological conflation with children and an assured future. I will use Edelman’s conceptualization 
of reproductive futurity in conversation with Althusser to frame my understanding of hegemonic 
power’s goals and the resistance of said goals by the monstrous subject at the scene of subversion. 
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The concept and even the etymology of the term “scene of subversion” that I am coining is 
informed by Saidiya Hartman’s concept of a “scene of subjection” that she coins and defines in 
her book Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America 
as “scenes in which terror can hardly be discerned…By defamiliarizing the familiar, [that] 
illuminate the terror of the mundane and quotidian rather than exploit the shocking spectacle… 
here is the diffusion of terror and the violence perpetuated under a rubric of pleasure, paternalism, 
and property. Consequently, the scenes of subjection examined here focus on the enactment of 
subjugation and the constitution of the subject” (4).  However, my concept of a scene of subversion 
is realized by looking at what Hartman calls “the shocking spectacle” which erupts out of the 
mundane scenes of subjection that intersect with Fred Moten’s idea of how “the history of 
blackness is testament to the fact that objects can and do resist” (1) in his book In the Break: The 
Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition. When one is “in search of a subject” (Hartman, 14) at 
the point where “objects can and do resist” one gets the scene of subversion, where the object or 
abject becomes a radical subject, a monstrous subject.     
Putting these theories in conversation with each other maps out an intersectional discourse 
and conceptualization of subversion, the monstrous, and subjectivity that is necessary in 
understanding the work in engaging with a discourse in how horror has been a subversive genre 
historically and continues to be so. However, when coming to a reckoning of these theories and 
conceptualizations, the concept of “monstrous subjectivity” seeks to bridge the gap between the 
notions of social death and hegemony while refraining from romanticization the position as 
oppressed and Othered. Rather, there is a recontextualization of power when understanding the 
ramifications of rejecting being Othered. A radical subject position surfaces that cannot exist 
within the systems of the oppressive structures, a subject position that is birthed out of the tension 
DiBono 7 
 
of abjection and resistance that proliferates and matures within its own contexts, which is in direct 
opposition to the contexts that sought to oppress or destroy it, a radical subjectivity that the reader 
is forced to confront and reckon with. It is the point ideology seeks to erase, and the subject is 
confronted with a form of fun-house mirror of speculative subjectivity that is familiar yet alien, 
desirable yet repulsive. The questions that this act of reckoning with monstrous subjectivity seek 
to raise and attempt to answer are: how does monstrous subjectivity’s function as an act of 
resistance/subversion seek to recontextualize or speculate on the recontextualization of the abject 
position? How does this function do the same act of recontextualizing or speculative 
recontextualizing in regard to positions of power? And if this recontextualizing takes place, what  
future can we as readers, scholars, and subjects then glean from that?   
 
“The Last of the Usher Race”: The Monstrous Feminine & a Futurity Denied  
  Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” was published in Burton’s 
Gentleman’s Magazine in September 1839. This short tale by Poe is considered to be a classic of 
the American horror canon. The tale follows an unnamed narrator who is visiting his childhood 
friend, Rodrick Usher, after receiving a concerning letter about his deteriorating physical and 
mental state. Upon the narrator’s arrival, Rodrick confides in his friend about the sorry state he 
and his family line are in. The days of the Usher race are numbered, with Rodrick’s poor health 
catching up to him and the likewise declining health of his twin sister, Madeline, who suffers from 
an ailment reminiscent of narcolepsy. Although alive when the narrator comes to the home, 
Madeline’s appearance is like that of a ghost. Within a few days of the narrator’s arrival, however, 
she seemingly dies of her ailments and her brother Rodrick decides to entomb her in the cellar 
rather than burying her at a cemetery. As time passes, one stormy night, the pair hear loud noises 
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throughout the house, Rodrick reveals that he may have buried Madeline prematurely, and in a 
climactic crescendo of horror, Madeline appears, bloodied and screaming. She then falls dead, as 
does Rodrick, commencing the collapse of the House of Usher. As the narrator rushes out, the tarn 
swallows the house whole.  
In his tale, however, the house and its residents do more than just die. This tale follows the 
key aesthetic formula of the Gothic horror genre with staples such as a haunting of sorts, the 
dilapidated pre-modern manor that is as much a character in the tale as the human—and/or 
formerly human—characters in the tale, and a morose landscape to pair with the manor house. 
This classic tale by Poe depicts a futurity that was interrupted and subsequently denied, the futurity 
in question being that of the Usher race. And who denies the Usher race their futurity? The one 
who denies the Ushers their entitled futurity is Madeline Usher. Throughout the text, Madeline is 
seen as simply a “mournful burden” (329), an object to be sequestered to the periphery; yet, by the 
end of the tale her screams are called “the death-cry of the dragon” (334). Here Madeline’s screams 
are conflated with the dragon in the story of Ethelred that the narrator reads to Rodrick, which acts 
as a metaphor for this monstrous metamorphosis of Madeline Usher that changes her from 
peripheral object to radical subject capable of being the final punctuation mark of the Usher line.           
 “The Fall of the House of Usher” is a paradigmatic example of the Gothic narrative, and 
Madeline Usher is emblematic of Poe’s Gothic oeuvre. Poe utilizes tropes reminiscent of David 
Punter and Elizabeth Bronfen’s definition of the Gothic, which they outline in their essay “Gothic 
Violence, Trauma and the Ethical”: 
[The] Gothic swerves away from that notion of the ‘precise point’…it recognizes 
that in fact wherever one digs one will come across the bones of the dead… and 
that instead of such excavations proving a new historical security, a new sense of 
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order and origin, they will merely produce an ‘overhang,’ an increasingly unstable 
superstructure as the foundations are progressively exposed. (12-16)    
Punter and Bronfen’s understanding of the Gothic in this quotation is discussing the subversive 
move with temporality that the Gothic makes as a genre. The genre’s capability to “swerve away” 
from the “precise point” of time in the past being excavated in order to subvert the comfortable 
idea of “a new historical security” or “new sense of order” is key to understanding the Gothic as a 
genre that is ripe with subversion from a “norm.” Poe’s tale is no different in its functionality of 
subversion. However, the subversion of ‘The Fall of the House of Usher” is at a “precise point,” 
and this point, or scene, is the scene of subversion, where the normative “order of things” is 
undermined in a radical act of resistance. Now, that being said, it is important to understand that 
“The Fall of the House of Usher” does not “swerve away” from the conventions of the Gothic 
expressed here by Punter and Bronfen; rather, I am more focused on mapping the point where this 
Gothic text produces or unveils the “increasingly unstable superstructure as the foundations [is] 
progressively exposed” (16), and how that point affects the concept of a future in the text. For 
“The Fall of the House of Usher” a possibility of a future of the Usher race is interrupted and 
denied and it is done so at this scene of subversion I will identify and map out.  
This function of the Gothic then coincides with thesis three of Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s 
essay “Monster Culture (Seven Theses),” aptly titled “The Monster is the Harbinger of Category 
Crisis.” The genre of the Gothic functions as a “refusal to participate in the classificatory ‘order of 
things’” (40), which renders the Gothic a monstrous landscape of ambiguity that is a ripe breeding 
ground for monstrous characters. Poe constructs his Gothic in the feminine form. According to 
Tracy Hayes in her article “Poe, Insanity, and Containing the Feminine Monstrous,” Poe’s 
portrayal of women is a “compounding [of] a morbid equation of beauty with mortality combined 
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with a monstrous betrayal by the feminine in both nature and nurture in his…aesthetic framework” 
(2). Madeline Usher in this tale therefore fit in with the trends of how Poe writes women, where 
“the monstrous [is] transferred onto the female object of devotion who seemingly perishes from a 
wasting disease only to return in an embodiment of Sigmund Freud’s unheimliche, the ‘unhomely’ 
monstrous which should [remain] suppressed but reappears evoking fear and dread” (3). However, 
the evocation of an uncanny dread vis-à-vis the monstrous feminine reaches its zenith in the 
horrific resurfacing of a blood-soaked Madeline Usher, which is the scene of subversion of the 
hegemonic intersection of patriarchal and class-based power. Here, Madeline Usher embodies the 
monstrous feminine, which is defined as “a masculine projection of womanhood unrestrained by 
the duty of nature the male unsuccessfully repressed by their male counterparts and thus [returns] 
in a perverted act of monstrous consummation” (3). She resists her positionality as feminine object 
by embracing a monstrous feminine subjectivity. The nature of her subjectivity is positioned in an 
oppositional space, a queer space, that seemingly originates inside of the male-centric imaginary 
that her brother, Rodrick, and the narrator of the tale uphold in their view—or lack thereof—of 
Madeline. What I mean by a lack of view is the lack of focus on Madeline as one of the last 
members of “the Usher race.” The true focus of the discourse in the tale frames Rodrick as the last 
of the Usher race, because when the concept of “the Usher race” is evoked, it is to imply the 
inherited patriarchal power of the aristocratic family dynamic. However, Madeline instead opposes 
this male gaze—or male blindness—and thus Madeline affects the male-imaginary in such a way 
that disrupts the possibility of a future within this patriarchal superstructure. By refusing her 
patriarchal categorization as a typical feminine object, subject, or abject. Madeline Usher displays 
a monstrous subjectivity that denies a futurity for the reproduction of the Usher line by castrating 
this space thus denying the reproduction of a male hegemonic power structure in Poe’s Gothic tale. 
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To first understand Madeline Usher as monstrous subject resisting and her effect on the 
male-centric psychic space, it is imperative to first understand the psychic space in question in 
Poe’s tale. The story is centered around the dynamic between the narrator of the tale and the 
patriarch of the House of Usher, Rodrick. The narrator comes to “the melancholy House of Usher” 
(317) after receiving a letter from Roderick that “spoke of acute bodily illness—of a mental 
disorder which oppressed him” (318). The narrator also describes the feeling that the House of 
Usher evokes “with the first glimpse of the building,” stating, “a sense of insufferable gloom 
pervaded my spirit. I say insufferable; for the feeling was unrelieved by any of that half-
pleasurable, because poetic, sentiment, with which the mind usually receives even in the sternest 
natural images of the desolate and terrible” (317).  From the beginning of the story, the derelict 
and pestilent-filled manor house foreshadows the narrator’s purpose for visiting this physical and 
psychic space of malady as symbolic of what David Blair, in his introduction to Gothic Short 
Stories, states as “the very Gothic idea of the degenerate legacy of a decaying European 
aristocracy” (xv). Understanding how the derelict state of the house reflects the decaying body 
politic as not just a trope of the Gothic, but also how this Gothic trope functions as this ambiguous 
breeding ground for the monstrous is imperative to properly identifying the scene of subversion 
that comes at the end of the tale. This breeding ground indicates an anticipation of the subversion, 
which is a process that Gothic horror is emblematic of. I use the term “breeding ground” both in 
its metaphoric term as being a space that creates something as well as literally a ground upon which 
breeding occurs.  
In this context, “The Fall of the House of Usher” then displays an environment that is 
anticipating the subversion that occurs at the intersection of class and gender in this tale, which is 
implied through the description of the Usher family. The narrator states, “his [Rodrick’s] very 
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ancient family had been noted, time out of mind, for a peculiar sensibility of temperament,” adding 
that “the stem of the Usher race, all time-honored as it was, had put forth, at no period, any enduring 
branch, in other words, that the entire family lay in the direct line of decent, and had always, with 
very trifling and very temporary variation so lain” (318). These lines do more in implication than 
in overt description when alluding to the transgressions of the House of Usher, which underscores 
the House’s “principal feature,” its “excessive antiquity” (319). The implication, according to 
Nadal, “evokes an unspecified transgressional family trauma in which hints of historical change 
and aristocratic decay can be traced” (185). This “transgressional family trauma” could well be 
“hints of incest [and/or] a family curse” (186). The narrator alludes to an implied incestuous 
relationship between Rodrick and Madeline Usher and their family’s “peculiar sensibility of 
temperament” (318). Another point where the narrator implies the possibility of Rodrick’s 
incestuous obsession for his sister is when the narrator attempts to trace Rodrick’s gloom “to a 
more natural and far more palpable origin—to the severe and long-continued illness—indeed to 
the evidently approaching dissolution—of a tenderly beloved sister—his sole companion for long 
years” (323). Therefore, the uncanny, the abject, and the monstrous all come out through the 
speculation of a supposed transgressive relationship. This trauma embodies itself as the maladies 
of the Usher twins, which have been considered “a family evil and one for which he despaired to 
find a remedy—a mere nervous affliction, he immediately added, which would undoubtably soon 
pass of” (322). Although there are afflictions that affect both Ushers, the focus of the story—or as 
the narrator states, “the object of my visit” (322)—is on the affliction of the sullen patriarch of the 
now dwindling Usher race. The narrator’s focus on Rodrick is important to call attention to because 
the Usher line would continue through his supposed progeny, yet none have been produced and 
his foreshadowed death thus makes the fall of the Usher race imminent. This is where the concept 
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of futurity and queer oppositionality comes into play in this tale. When discussing the concept of 
reproductive futurity, Lee Edelman states that:  
For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to 
produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as 
it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to 
transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual 
horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmic beneficiary of every political 
intervention. Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of 
women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame 
their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a “fight for our 
children—for our daughters and our sons” and thus a fight of the future. (3)   
Edelman identifies a key component to conservative ideology, which is the   conflation of the Child 
with an assured future, Children—as we shall see when discussing Turn of the Screw—are 
emblematic of a future of reproduction, because they are both the product of reproduction and are 
assumed to reproduce in the future as adults. As I have previously implied, the Usher family 
partake in “transgressive relationships” and they do so in order to assure a reproductive futurity of 
the Usher race. Therefore, the House of Usher is indeed a “breeding ground” in both senses of the 
term. It is assumed that Rodrick and Madeline are supposed to continue their family traditions and 
assure the continuance of the Usher race. Yet, the implication of incest paired with the diseases 
and disabilities that Rodrick and Madeline proport to have also anticipate not just an interruption 
but an end of this family cycle, a subversion of the incestuous patriarchal structure.     
 The aforementioned immanent destruction of the House of Usher is emblematic of 
Madeline Usher’s function in this text leading to the scene of subversion. As Hayes aptly states, 
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“Madeline Usher serves to act as both monstrare and monare—she is a portent of the moral and 
literal fall of the Usher line and its house” (4-5). In this quotation, Hayes is referring to the 
etymology of the term monster, which is to demonstrate (monstrare) and to warn (monare), and 
this is Madeline’s monstrous function in the narrative. The tale first demonstrates Madeline’s 
function when the narrator describes how Rodrick describes Madeline, which is as if she died 
before the narrator’s arrival, stating, “Her disease…would leave me…the last of the ancient race 
of the Ushers” (323). Rodrick is speculating on the determined passing of Madeline Usher, and 
the peculiar timing of the next scene that takes place is a response to this speculation, as the narrator 
states, “while [Roderick] spoke, Madeline (for so she was called) passed slowly through the remote 
portion of the apartment, and, without having noticed my presence disappeared. I regarded her 
with utter astonishment not unmingled with dread…A sensation of stupor oppressed me, as my 
eyes followed her retreating steps” (323). The liminality of her physical presence thus evokes the 
psychic interruption and power that she has over the gaze of the narrator, who is in “utter 
astonishment not unmingled with dread” (323), which is a feeling that “oppresses” him. The 
narrator expresses an anxiety regarding Madeline’s presence after hearing Rodrick state that she 
had passed. This spectral spectacle establishes the psychic effect Madeline Usher as monstrous has 
on the male-centric space, because “the monster’s body is both corporeal and incorporeal” (Cohen 
38-39). Here Madeline embodies the monstrous liminality of being both present, but also ethereal, 
which grants her a psychic power over the space that looks to make her abject.  Hayes discusses 
this ambiguous and seemingly undead presence, which is akin to Cohen’s point on the form of the 
vampire, when she states: 
This almost vampiric imagery is extended to Madeline, a narcoleptic and yet 
another beautiful young woman suffering from a wasting disease. Yet her presence, 
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although she is only glimpsed (alive) on two occasions by the narrator, permeates 
the house. Her mysterious hold over her brother is such that after her initial ‘death’ 
Roderick insists on preserving her body in one of the many vaults beneath the 
mansion for 2 weeks prior to her official internment. (5)             
The concept of Madeline’s presence permeating the house is indicative of her psychic effect on 
the male-centric space. The possibility of her resurfacing from her internment is a central point of 
anxiety for the men of the story—more so Rodrick than the narrator. Viewing her in the context 
that vampiric imagery evokes an understanding that she is the embodiment of death and pestilence 
that floods the psychic and physical space of the House of Usher similar to the “pestilent and  
mystical vapor” (319) that surrounds the threshold of the Usher estate.   
Besides Rodrick’s seemingly incestuous obsession for his twin sister, he is also obsessed 
with keeping her concealed and, most importantly, contained. After this initial introduction to 
Madeline, in which she is cast as a ghostly, apparitional figure, the narrator states that “for several 
days ensuing, her name was unmentioned by either Usher or myself” (324), which is indictive of 
the orienting power she carries in evoking the anxiety of the male space. In this statement by the 
narrator, the attempt to conceal Madeline is commencing. Instead of reconciling with her liminal 
positionality at the threshold of being perceived and conceived as well as the threshold of 
materiality and ethereality, the narrator and Rodrick seek to erase Madeline by making her abject. 
The narrator clearly articulates this desire to make Madeline abject through Rodrick’s act of 
concealing and containing Madeline when he states, “his intention of preserving her corpse for a 
fortnight (previously to its final internment) in one of the numerous vaults within the main walls 
of the building…The brother had been led to his resolution (so he told me) by consideration of the 
unusual character of the malady of the deceased” (328). The narrator uses the phase “a donjon 
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keep” (329) to describe this vault once depositing the corpse of Madeline, which implies that the 
temporary entombment of Madeline Usher’s body is more of an internment. Now having 
articulated Rodrick’s desire to conceal and intern Madeline, this act is contradictory to preserving 
the Usher race, because his anxiety of the monstrous feminine overpowers the patriarchal pressure 
of reproductive futurity. This overpowering of anxiety seems to be an act of Rodrick thus giving 
him the power, yet it is the monstrous feminine that is the impetus of such an anxiety therefore 
showing that it is the monstrous that is the center of the act of denying reproductive futurity.  That 
being said, Hayes does aptly articulate Rodrick’s intention of this internment, stating, “the larger 
notion of containing the feminine in order to control its monstrous threat to a particular patriarchal 
milieu. Rodrick needs to contain his sister in order to perpetuate the Usher line” (5). This intention 
of Madeline’s internment is accurate to the pattern of behavior needed to keep the deteriorating 
hegemonic structure of aristocratic patriarchy going since Madeline is the warning of the 
destruction to come. Even the material of the vault is symbolic of Rodrick’s desire to contain 
Madeline. The narrator describes the vault being “sheathed in copper [and] the door, of massive 
iron, had been, also, similarly protected” (329). Hayes elaborates on the significance of copper and 
iron in this encasement, stating, “copper was associated with eternal feminine youth, and iron was 
regularly used as a ward against ghost and spirits. This coupled with Rodrick’s preferred reading 
material…signifies that Rodrick took steps to ensure that Madeline, and all she represents, was 
properly contained. However, the threat of the feminine monstrous maintains” (5). Therefore, the 
vault not only signifies the repression of the generational trauma in the psyche, but also the 
containment of the conduit of this trauma in the monstrous form of Madeline’s corpse. The narrator 
describes Madeline Usher’s body as having “the mockery of a faint blush upon the bosom and the 
face, and the suspiciously lingering smile upon the lip which is so terrible in death” (329), and the 
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statement of the “suspiciously lingering smile” points to the anxiety of the monstrous feminine 
being able to return. Due to this anxiety of a monstrous transformation of the feminine Usher, 
Rodrick seeks to preserve her femininity prior to death, a femininity informed by the hegemonic 
powers of patriarchy and their upper class. However, this internment and the abjection it 
perpetuates fails.  
The patriarchy fails to contain the monstrous feminine in this text, which leads to the 
sanguineous crescendo of this Gothic tale. After the narrator and Rodrick have “deposited [their] 
mournful burden” (329), the narrator describes how when retiring to bed, he “experienced the full 
power of such feelings…[he] struggled to reason off the nervousness which had dominion over 
[him]” (330). Here the narrator displays how the monstrous feminine has a psychic effect on the 
male-centric space even when Madeline is concealed and contained, thus showing the failure of 
such a containment and the anticipation of her resurfacing. Her resurfacing and the subsequential 
effects that it has brought is what I would like to call the “scene of subversion.” When Madeline 
Usher returns with “blood upon her white robes, and the evidence of some bitter struggle upon 
every portion of her emaciated frame” (335), the failure of the containment at the hands of the 
patriarchy physically manifests as this almost vampiric image of Madeline Usher who had broken 
out of her containment. This scene of subversion is a key moment of the monstrous that Cohen 
articulates as a “refusal to participate in the classificatory ‘order of things’ … [and these monsters] 
are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in any 
systematic structuration. And so the monster is dangerous, a form suspended between forms that 
threatens to smash distinctions” (40). The distinction that Madeline Usher’s “form between forms” 
seeks to smash is the gender distinction. In breaking free of her premature tomb, she refuses to be 
caged by patriarchal hegemony and made abject to maintain the peace and comfort for the 
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oppressive power of the masculinist space. In this scene, the bloody Madeline Usher is this 
harbinger of destruction to the Usher house and line while also being an embodied reminder of 
menstruation—through the imagery of her clothes covered in blood—thus confronting the 
masculine space with the monstrous feminine form as an act of rejection from her oppression.  
This confrontation with the monstrous feminine also resurfaces the repressed trauma of 
castration anxiety in the masculine space. Barbra Creed best articulates this function of the 
monstrous feminine in “Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imagery of Abjection” when she 
states, “the concept of the monstrous-feminine, as constructed within/by a patriarchal and 
phallocentric ideology, is related intimately to the problem of sexual difference and castration…the 
difference of female sexuality as a difference that is grounded in monstrousness and that invokes 
castration anxiety in the male spectator” (212). Reading this scene of the monstrous feminine as a 
scene of subversion suggests that Madeline does not accept her given positionality as feminine 
object for men to gaze upon or speculate about. Rather than being viewed in these positionalities, 
Madeline Usher presents herself as monstrous subject; therefore, she claims her selfhood outside 
of the constraints of hegemony and thus destabilizes the norm thus bringing the story to its 
catastrophic end. At the end, the narrator describes, “the mighty walls rushing asunder—there was 
a long tumultuous shouting sound like the voice of a thousand waters—and the deep and dank tarn 
at my feet closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of ‘the House of Usher’” (335-336); it is 
here that the result of the monstrous subject’s scene of subversion is fulfilled, where the phallic 
symbol of patriarchal hegemony, the Usher estate, comes crumbling due to the power of the 
monstrous feminine.  
It is imperative to see Madeline Usher’s rise into monstrous subjectivity vis-à-vis her scene 
of subversion as a function of the Gothic horror genre in order to develop the concept that the 
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Gothic horror genre as one of radical resistance. As Jack Halberstam states regarding Gothic horror 
as a genre in “Parasites and Perverts: An Introduction to Gothic Monstrosity”: 
Gothic fiction is a technology of subjectivity, one which produces the deviant 
subjectivities opposite which the normal, the healthy, and the pure can be known. 
Gothic, within my analysis, may be loosely defined as the rhetorical style and 
narrative structure designed to produce fear and desire within the reader. The 
production of fear in a literary text…emanates from a vertiginous excess of 
meaning. Gothic, in a way, refers to an ornamental excess…a rhetorical 
extravagance that produces, quite simply too much…and part of the experience of  
horror comes from the realization that meaning itself runs riot. (149) 
 In this definition, Halberstam discusses how the Gothic is “a technology of subjectivity” and that 
the overstimulation of and meaning creates a narrative able to invoke horror, which “The Fall of 
the House of Usher” best represents in Madeline Usher’s scene of subversion and subsequent 
monstrous subjectivity. As Madeline Usher displays in her claiming of her monstrous “deviant” 
subjectivity and denying any form of reproductive futurity of the Usher race, she does not define 
“the correct” subjectivity in the story, because her subjectivity by the end does not get “corrected” 
but rather is the tool of correction or deviant punishment. Her monstrous subjectivity strips the 
patriarchal subjectivity of its meaning and function, in effect castrating the male space. This power 
to strip hegemony of its meaning and function is the kernel that defines the Gothic horror genre as 
a genre of resistance. As Cohen states in his seventh thesis, “these monsters ask us how we perceive 
the world, and how we have misrepresented what we have attempted to place. They ask us to 
reevaluate our cultural assumptions about race, gender, sexuality, our perception of difference, our 
tolerance toward its expression” (52). Therefore, monstrous subjectivity is a technology of 
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resistance that produces the means of its own selfhood by freeing itself from the constraints of the 
oppressive hegemony looking to contain, conceal, or destroy the monstrous.            
 
Queering the Screw: Subversive Performativity of Childhood & a Futurity Rejected 
Henry James’ Gothic horror novella, The Turn of the Screw, was originally published 
serially in Collier’s Weekly from January 27- April 16, 1898. Then in October of the same year, 
James’ widely popular ghostly tale was collected and published as part of The Two Magics. As 
David Bromwich and Phillip Horne state in their introduction to the 2011 Penguin Classics edition 
of the novella, “’The Turn of the Screw’ holds a unique place in the canon of Henry James’ fiction. 
Alongside ‘Daisy Miller’ (1878), and The Portrait of a Lady (1881), it has proved the most 
lastingly popular of his works. Yet the prose is that of James’ intricate later style, and the narration 
has the quality of a controlled experiment” (xiii). The concept of The Turn of the Screw being a 
“controlled experiment” using ambiguity as its stimuli is the narrative locus that lends well to the 
horror in this novella. This experiment is prefaced with a Christmas scene, where wealthy folk tell 
ghost tales around the hearth—a typical custom in Victorian society (see Dickens’ A Christmas 
Carol). One gentleman in particular sends for a manuscript of a tale deemed “too horrible…for 
general uncanny ugliness, horror, and pain” (4). The manuscript in question was gifted to this 
gentleman by his sister’s governess and this horror-filled narrative is her account of the events at 
her previous job at a country estate called Bly Manor. The narrative account depicts the Governess’ 
decent into ambiguous dread over the potential corruption of her two wards, Miles and Flora, at 
the hands of two ghosts of former staff: Peter Quint, the master’s old valet, and Miss Jessel, the 
governess before the narrator of this account. The governess’s perception of the children starts out 
with her perceiving them as “Raphael’s holy infants” (13), but as the ambiguity and horror begin 
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to settle in and the governess’ dread incrementally increases, her perception of the children also 
begins to dwindle to “little wretches” (75). Her attempt at saving these children from their possible 
corruption leads to disastrous results, with Flora ill and leaving Bly, and Miles dead by the story’s 
end. Bromwich and Horne’s description of James’ prose in this novella as a “controlled 
experiment” is accurate—especially when considering how “the story turns on a question that 
belongs to metaphysics and morals: to what extent can our knowledge of reality be separated from 
the psychology of the person we rely on for a faithful description?” (Bromwich & Horne, xiii). 
However, moving the focus from the reliability of the narration to the implications of power and 
identity that the narrative develops unveils the novella to also be an “experiment in control.”  
What I mean by an “experiment of control” of course comes from the focus on the roles 
that the characters of the Governess, Miles, Flora, Peter Quint, and Miss Jessel take on—and, in 
some cases, problematize or subvert, which reveals a narrative of the failure of hegemonic power. 
The primary intersection of hegemony the text represents is that of class and gender. The 
governess, with her “supreme authority” (8), acts as an Althusserian ideological state apparatus 
(ISA) who seeks to regulate the household and interpollate the two children as subjects of their 
gender and class in the novella. However, her attempt at regulation/interpollation fails and she 
consequently projects her failures onto the ghosts—Peter Quint and Miss Jessel—who embody a 
queering of gender norms, spirits who intend to “corrupt” the impressionable youths under the 
governess’ care. Specifically, I will be focusing on Miles and his supposed “corruption” by the 
ghost of Peter Quint. Understanding the adversarial dynamics between the governess and Peter 
Quint and Miles is key to understanding Miles’ queer performance of monstrous subjectivity, a 
subjectivity that knowingly rejects the hegemonic power seeking to interpollate the monstrous 
subject(s) into its “normative context.”  
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In order to understand the subjectivity of Miles and Peter Quint as monstrous, it is 
important to first understand the Governess as this figure of power in the novella. The governess 
in this text (attempts to) fall under two categories of the Althusserian model of the ISA: the family 
ISA and the educational ISA. Althusser defines ISAs as “a certain number of realities, which 
present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions” 
(96). Understanding the governess as an intersection between the domestic and the educational 
ISAs is imperative in grasping where she fails at interpollating Miles and the implications thereof. 
She is positioned in a role of “supreme authority” (8), as the preface states, and she embodies that 
authority from the instant she meets Flora when she states, “it was a comfort that there could be 
no uneasiness in a connexion with anything so beatific as the radiant image of my little girl” (12). 
Here, the governess uses the term “my little girl” in regard to Flora to indicate a form of ownership 
over her, a sentiment she also shares for Miles with statements such as “my children” (30). The 
governess displays a form of surrogate maternal ownership of the children, which is indicative of 
the Family ISA; here, the governess makes it known that she is in control of these children as a de 
facto mother figure—even the title, governess speaks to her controlling function at Bly. Thus, 
when stating such sentiments as “to watch, teach, ‘form’ little Flora would too evidentially be the 
making of a happy and useful life” (13), the governess displays her position as educational ISA. 
The governess then blurs the delineation between the domestic space and the educational space, 
thus making Bly just a purely ideological space where the governess simply seeks to “form” them. 
Throughout the text, the governess reminds the reader of her station and the implied (or projected) 
responsibilities thereof. One such moment takes place in the unfolding of a key scene in the text, 
the first sighting of the “devious” Peter Quint. When remarking on her unfamiliarity with the 
specter, the governess states, “I just bridled a little with the sense of how my office seemed to 
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require that there should be no such ignorance and no such person” (25). Here, the governess 
expresses how she as governess should know all persons who come and go at Bly, implying that 
she is supposed to be at the epistemological head of Bly’s body politic, yet she falls short of 
knowing in this scene of being confronted by the monstrous. Also, in this instance she positions 
herself as an officer by calling her position “my office,” thus indicating that her positioning as ISA 
in the framework of her narrative is a conscious one. Then, after deliberation with Ms. Grose, the 
maid whom the governess befriends, regarding Peter Quint’s unwelcomed (re)appearance, the 
governess gives herself the role of “an expiatory victim” whose job it is to “guard the tranquility 
of the rest of the household,” adding that it is “[t]he children in especial [she] should thus fence 
about and absolutely save” (38).  The governess expresses her anxiety that these specters are after 
the children and it is therefore in her authority to “absolutely save” the children from this 
corrupting, uncanny Other that is invading her space of authority. The governess is setting up the 
psychological stage of what will be a queer performance of monstrous proportions. 
The definition of queer that I seek to implement in regard to Quint and Miles is best 
articulated by Lee Edelman in No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, when he states: 
To make the claim I examine here in this book the pervasive invocation of the Child 
as the emblem of futurity’s unquestioned value and purpose against it the 
impossible project of a queer oppositionality that would oppose itself to the 
structural determinants of politics as such, which is also to say that would oppose 
itself to the logic of the opposition. This paradoxical formulation suggests a 
refusal—the appropriately perverse refusal that characterizes queer theory—of 
every substantialization of identity, which is always oppositionally defined, and, by 
extension, of history as a linear narrative (the poor man’s teleology) in which 
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meaning succeeds in revealing itself—as itself—through time. Far from partaking 
of this narrative moment toward a viable political future, far from perpetuating the 
fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer comes to figure the bar to every 
realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure 
or form. (3-4)                                     
This definition of queerness as always consciously oppositional and anti-futural is imperative to 
understanding Miles’s and Quint’s effects on the governess. Throughout the novella, Miles 
indicates a level of acute awareness of his position in the governess’ “experiment of control.” This 
awareness, however, is not one of nefarious intent as the governess projects. Rather, as Adam 
McCune states, “The Turn of the Screw is the story of the children’s desires, how their desires are 
inhibited by the governess and how the children perform childhood and adulthood to get what they 
want…the children’s desires are all perfectly ordinary and may be summed up by the desire to live 
for themselves rather than their governess” (952). McCune hits at a crucial detail regarding the 
desires of the children that intersects with Edelman’s definition of queerness being oppositional to 
(normative) authority. The children’s desires are by definition queer desires and the inclinations 
of nefariousness and corruption are projections on the part of the governess which all happen after 
receiving a lack of details as to why Miles has been expelled from school. Then throughout the 
novella, the governess constantly reflects on how Miles is “certainly quite unpunishable” (29), but 
at the same time she recounts how “if he had been wicked, he would have ‘caught’ it, and I should 
have caught it by the rebound—I should have found a trace, should have felt the wound and the 
dishonour” (29). In this instance—and many others like it—the governess engages in a form of 
Foucauldian panoptical surveillance with her gaze, seeking the “corruption” or, rather, seeking the 
queerness that got Miles expelled. The governess is always in constant anticipation of the moment 
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when Miles will reveal himself to be an “injury to the others” (17), but when being surveilled 
Miles is an “earthy beauty…[and has an] unnatural goodness” (70). The governess, however, reads 
this performance as “a game,” “a policy and a fraud” (70), or even more simply, she reads it as a 
performance (as opposed to a “natural” childlike innocence). This deception on the part of Miles 
is due to his suspected consorting with the queer specter of Peter Quint, who the governess 
describes as having “a touch of the strange freedom…in the sign of familiarity of his wearing no 
hat” (25), as well as having “rather queer whiskers…He gives me a sort of sense of looking like 
an actor” (36). This is important to note, because the governess has already positioned Quint as a 
queer figure who is putting on a conscious performance of opposition to her position as ISA, which 
is the performance she also projects onto Miles. The governess’ anxiety regarding Miles’ seeming 
corruption and her consequential quest to protect him from it is, as Edelman puts it, “a fight for 
the future” (3), because “How could one take the other ‘side,’ when taking any side at all 
necessarily constrains one to take the side of, by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that 
returns to the Child as the image the future intends?” (3). To Edelman, “reproductive futurity” is 
that future that the Child embodies. Therefore, the governess is the side that is supposedly “fighting 
for the children” as opposed to the other side—the queer side—that consists “of those not ‘fighting 
for the children,’ the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value 
of reproductive futurism” (3). The governess positions these ghosts as not “fighting for the 
children” and therefore they must be looking to harm the children when she remarks on where she 
has seen them stating “’They’re only seen across, as it were, and beyond—in strange places and 
on high places…They’ve only to keep to their suggestions of danger.’ ‘For the children to come?’ 
‘And perish in the attempt!’” (71). These ghosts are (im)purely looking to harm these children in 
the eyes of the governess, and while the governess and Ms. Grose speculate and deliberate in close 
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proximity of the children, the children have the time and space to undermine the governess’ 
controlling advances. 
 Miles subverts the governess because, in the words of the governess, “they know—it’s too 
monstrous: they know, they know!” (44). And what is it that the children know? They “know what 
we [the governess and Mrs. Gross] know—and heaven knows what more besides!” (44). Miles 
displays his awareness and his intent as an anti-futural queer figure when he is one-on-one with 
the governess, which is when he makes such statements as, “Think me—for a change—bad!... 
When I’m bad I am bad!” (68). Here, Miles indicates an awareness of his own behavior and 
identifies with it. He also tells the governess how he and his sister arrange together when he is to 
be “bad,” which later in a conversation with Mrs. Grose leads the governess to say, “They haven’t 
been good—they’ve only been absent. It has been easy to live with them because they’re simply 
leading a life of their own. They’re not mine—they’re not ours, They’re his and they’re hers” (70). 
This statement is key because the governess realizes that her “experiment of control” is failing and 
she projects that failure onto this monstrous corruption of Miles at the hand of the queer figures of 
the ghosts. Consequently, while Mrs. Grose and Bly’s ISA have this rather loud conversation, the 
governess “demanded in a lower tone, while the children, having smiled and nodded and kissed 
hands to us, resumed their exhibition” (70). This scene is key to understanding that the children, 
especially Miles, are acutely aware of their being in this “experiment of control,” which they enjoy 
subverting. In response, the governess thinks that she cannot call off this experiment otherwise she 
will not be able to save these children, but she is not sure if they are fully aware thus the need to 
keep up appearances which is a position the governess calls “the mockery of their advantage” (75).   
 Miles and Flora do coordinate a seemingly scene of subversion, an event that points to the 
phenomena of a character embodying a subjectivity of resistance from normative roles, and that 
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scene is when Miles is found outside of the manor at night and seemingly stares at the governess 
through a window but is actually staring above her. I intentionally look over that scene because 
the later moment where Miles tells the governess of his intentions is the true scene of subversion. 
In this scene the governess points out that “Miles’ whole title to independence, the rights of his 
sex and situation, were so stamped upon him that if he had suddenly struck for freedom, I should 
have nothing to say…I call it a revolution because I now see how, with the word he spoke, the 
curtain rose on the last act of my dreadful drama and the catastrophe was precipitated” (78), and 
that is exactly what Miles does through his dialogue. When he addresses the governess stating, 
“Look here, my dear, you know…when in the world, please, am I going back to school” (78), 
Miles is mimicking the syntax of an adult. Calling the governess “my dear” as though they were 
newlyweds instead of a governess and her ward queers the dynamic by shifting the power in the 
dialogue. This queerness is akin to the Bakhtinian concept of the carnivalesque, where the power 
structures are flipped. This is the scene of subversion because Miles, in his oppositional queerness, 
takes the power from the ISA of the household, which Miles punctuates by stating his intent for 
leaving the house, stating, “to show you [the governess] I could! ... And I can again” (79-80). Here 
lies the monstrous subjectivity: Miles has the power to come and go as he pleases, but the 
governess is duty bound and cannot leave the constraints of Bly or she cannot keep “forming” the 
children. The governess is not only appalled by this freedom, but she also covets it. As Cohen 
states:  
The monster is continually linked to forbidden practices in order to normalize and 
to enforce. The monster also attracts. The same creatures who terrify and interdict 
can evoke potent escapist fantasies; the linking of monstrosity with the forbidden 
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makes the monster all the more appealing as a temporary egress from constraint… 
we distrust and loathe the monster at the same time we envy its freedom…(49)     
The governess displays this desire on multiple occasions, such as when she states, “I walked in a 
world of their invention—they had no occasion whatever to draw upon mine” (42). Constantly, 
she notes the disconnect between the perception of the children and her own and expresses her 
admiration and desire to see what they see. She also expresses that with Quint and his “strange 
freedom…and a familiarity” (25), when she sees him with no hat. She battles with a latent desire 
to see their world, a world deemed as by virtue of her normative “office.” The governess 
understands that her role is to stymie any behavior considered “out of place,” and at the same time 
she desires it. Miles in this scene of subversion is abnormally aware of that and he plays into it by 
always emphasizing his ability to seek freedom and disregarding the statements of the governess 
that try to interpellate him back into her hegemony. His performing chaos to her order is his queer, 
monstrous embodiment as deemed by the governess, instead of denying this positionality, Miles 
embraces it as a place of play—similar to Derridean “free-play.” As a result, the expectations of 
his gender and his class status become arbitrary.  
 Unlike Madeline Usher, Miles’ monstrous subjectivity does not lead to the collapse of Bly 
in a dramatic scene of calamity. Instead, his monstrous subjectivity leads to his own death. After 
Miles performs the “monstrous utterance of names,” shouting “Peter Quint—you devil” (124), in 
response to the governess’ interrogation, the governess in turn sees this as a victory because it is 
Miles who has unveiled his knowledge, but it is a victory at what cost? Miles’s death is the ultimate 
failure of the governess. The main point of her “office” was to protect the children, yet young Flora 
leaves Bly ill and Miles dies in her arms. The governess ultimately fails to maintain the household 
and to interpollate. She instead exemplifies the ruin that will take place when failing to interpollate 
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or rather when that attempt is met with resistance to interpolation. The ISA has no response to a 
rejection of ideology because it is in the function of the ISA to reject Others from ideology, thus 
making the abject. This conundrum leads this ISA to destroy what she cannot successfully contain 
or reject, but, as Cohen also states, “no monster tastes of death but once” (38-39); the monster 
always returns and bringing with it new criticisms of normative structures. In a context where the 
ghosts are real, who is to say that Miles seeks death to be like Quint, a queer specter, a “harbinger 
of category crisis” (Cohen, 40)? Or rather in death, Miles unveils the greatest failure of the 
normative structure to preserve the reproductive futurity of the Child, thus in turn making the 
governess, the ISA in the novella, a queer character herself by the end. The monstrous has 
reproduced itself in the thing seeking to oppress it, but which has also desired to become it. 
Therefore, Miles in his death indicates how “Monsters are our children. They can be pushed into 
the farthest margins of geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the 
forbidden recesses of our mind, but they will always return. They ask us to reevaluate our cultural 
assumptions… our tolerance toward its expression. They ask us why we have created them” 
(Cohen, 52). Miles may have embraced the monstrous and gained a monstrous subjectivity, a 
freedom from the structures that sought to hinder him, but, ultimately, the creation of Miles as 
monstrous is a construction of the governess. She must reconcile with the question of why she 
made him monstrous as do all upholders of hegemonic structures must reckon with the creation of 
their own monsters. 
 
Monstrously Beloved: Black Radical Subjectivity & a Futurity Claimed 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved is a novel about an escaped slave and mother, Sethe, who does 
the seemingly unthinkable, committing infanticide, when faced with the threat of being taken back 
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to enslavement on the farmstead ironically named Sweet Home. She attempts to kill all four of her 
children, two girls and two boys, but only succeeds in killing her older daughter, Beloved, and is 
consequently sent to jail still nursing her younger daughter, Denver.  Throughout the novel, Sethe 
faces the ramifications from the community of Black folk in Ohio for committing such a societal 
taboo. Not only is she alienated from the community, but her home is also haunted by the specter 
of her murdered child. Ultimately, Beloved is a novel of haunted and non-normative temporality, 
where the past permeates the present and implies a futurity, specifically a radical Black female 
futurity—a futurity that enables a radical form of freedom, a freedom with a historicity that 
Morrison goes into detail describing in the forward to her novel: 
I think now it was the shock of liberation that drew my thoughts to what “free” 
could possibly mean to women. In the eighties, the debate was still roiling equal 
pay, equal treatment, access to professions, schools…and choice without stigma. 
To marry or not. To have children or not. Inevitably these thoughts led me to the 
different history of black women in this country—a history in which marriage was 
discouraged, impossible, or illegal; in which birthing children was required, but 
“having” them, being responsible for them—being, in other words, their parent—
was as out of the question as freedom. Assertions of parenthood under conditions 
peculiar to the logic of institutional enslavement were criminal…The heroine 
would represent the unapologetic acceptance of shame and terror; assume the 
consequences of choosing infanticide; claim her own freedom. (xvi-xvii)      
This sentiment and historicity that inform Morrison’s lived experiences as well as the collective 
lived experiences of the Black womanhood she portrays in the novel is pervasive in the novel’s 
totality. There are two concepts Morrison posits in this excerpt from the forward that I will focus 
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on, the first of which is the distinction between giving birth to children and “having” children, and 
how the act of “having” children is a radical act of Black female subjectivity. The second concept 
Morrison posits is viewing Sethe as “the heroine” who embraces and embodies the “shame and 
terror [and] assume[s] the consequences of choosing infanticide; claim[ing] her own freedom” 
(xvii). This concept points to the statement she makes about women’s liberation being about 
“choice without stigma,” yet she centers the idea of the stigma of Black motherhood, which 
supports her positing “the different history of black women.” That stigma is difficult to near 
impossible to separate from the experience of being a Black woman in a white supremacist 
landscape. This sentiment is akin to Orlando Patterson’s concept of social death: namely, how can 
someone not acknowledged as part of/subjected to the society that oppresses them also be held to 
the standards of that structure? Outside of chronology, I intentionally situate the discourse of this 
impasse at the intersection of Blackness and femininity in Beloved last. Beloved is the point at 
which the complex intersections of historically oppressed identities converge: the feminine, the 
queer, and, most prominently, Blackness.  
The term of monstrous subjectivity that I work to define in this paper comes to its zenith 
in this nexus of oppressed positionality to which a discourse of subjectivity already exists, which 
is that of “Black radical subjectivity” as defined by bell hooks in her book Yearning, Race, Gender, 
and Cultural Politics. In this epigraph, hooks commences the work of defining this form of radical 
subjectivity by discussing resistance, struggle, and liberation, when she states: 
 I often begin courses which focus on African-American literature, and sometimes 
specifically black women writers, with a declaration by Paulo Freire which had a 
profound liberatory effect on my thinking: “We cannot enter the struggle as objects 
in order to later become subjects.” This statement compels reflection on how the 
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dominated, the oppressed, the exploited make ourselves subject. How do we create 
an oppositional world view, a consciousness, an identity, a standpoint that exists 
not only as that struggle which also opposes dehumanization but as that movement 
which enables creative, expansive self-actualization? Opposition is not enough. 
(19)     
 In Beloved, Sethe displays and puts into action hooks’ idea of the creation of an “oppositional 
world view” of “expansive self-actualization,” which is centered on Black womanhood and the 
futurity of Black womanhood outside of the constraints of white patriarchy. Similar to Morrison 
in the forward, hooks is pointing to the impasse between hegemonic subjecthood and 
afropessemistic social death, but instead of asking “how,” hooks is asking “why”: why would one 
considered a non-person do the work of the struggle and resist their status as non-person to then 
be a subject of the oppressive hegemony? Reckoning with this question brings the concept of the 
futurity of Black womanhood into the forefront of the discourse. This futurity takes on a queerness 
as well akin to the queerness articulated by Edelman, but rather than queerness being situated as 
“the side of those not ‘fighting for the children’” (3), this queerness is the side “fighting for the 
children,” the side that is fighting for Black children. This side in the context of Beloved is still 
“the side outside the consensus, which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive 
futurism” (3), but Sethe and Beloved do not embody the rejection of reproductive futurity in its 
totality. Instead, theirs is a rejection of the reproduction of the objects of white supremacy. It is a 
rejection of a reproductive futurity of the institution of slavery. This rejection of the futurity of 
white patriarchal supremacy and the centering of a queer, Black, feminine positionality is where 
the monstrous subjectivity of Black radical subjecthood positions itself. 
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 Before moving to close reading of the novel and identifying these modes of the 
“oppositional world view” that is monstrous subjectivity, it is imperative to first identify another 
existing discourse that seeks to reconcile an impasse in Black American literature. This discourse 
of the Black radical tradition lies between Saidiya Hartman in her book Scenes of Subjection: 
Terror, Slavery, and Self-making in Nineteenth Century America and Fred Moten’s response to 
Hartman’s epigraph in his work In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition. This 
discourse regards what Hartman calls “the ‘terrible spectacle’” (3) of the beating of Frederick 
Douglass’s Aunt Hester, recounted by Douglass in his various slave narratives/autobiographies. 
Hartman rightfully calling this scene a “terrible spectacle” introduces a stance on the practice of 
invoking and reproducing violence inflicted on Black bodies as rehashing generational trauma, as  
Hartman states: 
 The passage through the blood-stained gate is an inaugural moment in the 
formation of the enslaved. In this regard, it is a primal scene. By this I mean that 
the terrible spectacle dramatizes the origin of the subject and demonstrates that to 
be a slave is to be under the brutal power and authority of another…I have chosen 
not to reproduce Douglass’s account of the beating of Aunt Hester in order to call 
attention to the ease with which such scenes are usually reiterated, the casualness 
with which they are circulated, and the consequences of this routine display of the 
slave’s ravaged body. (3)                
Hartman is hitting at a key issue in the discourse of literature recounting the trauma of the Black 
diaspora: that readers and scholars alike are too comfortable with retelling these “primal scenes” 
of Black pain. This is similar to the contemporary criticism of film and television displaying what 
is known as “Black torture porn,” which is almost exclusively set in some distant past or obscure 
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national geography—like Quentin Tarantino’s 2012 film Django Unchained—for the white gaze 
in order to invoke an illusory sense of comfortability that such violence is not perpetuated in the 
contemporary Black experience. If this is so, then why is a concept like Black futurity or 
subjectivity seen as “radical”? This concept of radical temporality and exposing the uncomfortable 
truth of such a comfortability of the white gaze is pervasive in Beloved as well. However, that does 
not diminish the issue of the graphic scenes of violence in the novel, which then posits these 
questions: Does the violence of the novel center the white gaze? Would providing the passages of 
infanticide from Beloved in this project undermine the stance taken by Hartman? How can one 
present such scenes of violence without reproducing the systemic violence that centers the white 
gaze? Before attempting to answer these questions, it is imperative to first understand Moten’s  
response to Hartman.  
Moten begins his response with a definition of Blackness as a movement and a definition 
of subjectivity stating: 
The history of blackness is testament to the fact that objects can and do resist. 
Blackness—the extended movement of a specific upheaval, an ongoing irruption 
that anarranges every line—is a strain that pressures the assumption of the 
equivalence of personhood and subjectivity. While subjectivity is defined by the 
subject’s possession of itself and its objects, it is troubled by a dispossessive force 
objects exert such that the subject seems possessed by the object it possesses. (1)       
The reason I begin by looking at his definition of objectivity and subjectivity is because from the 
first lines Moten is framing his response to the discourse opened by Hartman in her book. However, 
I would like to make it clear that I am not pitting these two against each other but rather presenting 
two texts in conversation with each other that making space for a more complex relationship 
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between object, subject, abject, and radical or oppositional positionalities and I say this before 
presenting Moten’s direct address to Hartman’s claim of not reproducing the scenes of Aunt 
Hester’s beating. Moten addresses Hartman’s claim, stating: 
The decision not to reproduce the account of Aunt Hester’s beating is, in some 
sense, illusory. First, it is reproduced in her reference to and refusal of it; second, 
the beating is reproduced in every scene of subjection the book goes on to read—
in both the ritual performances combining terror and enjoyment in slavery and the 
fashionings and assertions of citizenship and “free” subjectivity after 
emancipation…What are the politics of this unavoidably reproducible and 
reproductive performance? What is held in the ongoing disruption of its primality? 
…What does this disturbance of capture and genesis give to black performance? 
(4) 
Moten’s calling of such a refusal of reproduction “illusory” without undermining Hartman’s 
“considerable, formidable, and rare brilliance” (4) is very important to how the scene of subversion 
develops in this project.  Moten continues to unpack of Hartman by discussing “the space she 
leaves for the ongoing (re)production of that performance in all its guises and for a critical 
awareness of how each of those guises is always already present in and disruptive of the supposed 
originarity of that prial scene” (4), which is imperative to reconciling the disruptive and 
dispossessive resistance of the object with  the mundane, ritualistic performances of pain, terror, 
and pleasure that defines “scenes of subjection.” In reconciling these concepts the concept, I define 
in this project, the scene of subversion comes to fruition. It is at this intersection that I am interested 
in how the central primal scene of violence in Beloved is (re)produced in the mundane 
performances of Sethe vis-à-vis the alienation she experiences from her community in response to 
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the primal scene and the haunting of 124 Bluestone Road. It is a primal scene, that like Douglass’s 
account of the whipping of his Aunt Hester, is a genesis, but not of the enslaved subject or of the 
resisting, dispossessing object, but of the monstrous subject. Sethe’s choice to commit infanticide 
is a choice of subjection, it is an act of perverse maternal love—a type of love that is radical, a 
Black mother’s love (even the concept of motherhood in the context of Blackness in this text is 
radical). And like the violence, gore, and trauma of childbirth, Sethe performs a monstrous self-
birth which rejects the (re)productive futurity of the slave economy. For these reasons, it is 
imperative to present this violent scene of subversion and unpack its historicity in order to fully 
understand the radical movement of monstrous subjectivity, which is a key function necessary to 
commence a new radical practice of reading horror literature. 
 Now to actually examine this scene of subversion. I will not be looking precisely at the 
violence Sethe inflicts on the bodies of her children, but rather at the effect that violence has on 
the characters who witnessed such a spectacle and Sethe’s own retelling of the scene in question. 
These two angles of the scene help us fully realize it as one of subversion from an oppressive 
context, and that is what this scene spawns are indeed a radical form of subjectivity. After 
witnessing the bloody, “primal” scene, the slaveowner from Sweet Home looking for Sethe, named 
the Schoolteacher, sees: 
 That there was nothing there to claim. The three (now four—because she’d had the 
one coming when she cut) p____s they had hoped were alive and well enough to 
take back to Kentucky, take back and raise properly to do the work Sweet Home 
desperately needed, were not. Two were lying open-eyed in sawdust; a third 
pumped blood down the dress of the main one—the woman schoolteacher bragged 
about, the one he said made fine ink, damn good soup, pressed his collars the way 
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he liked besides having at least ten breeding years left. But now she’d gone 
wild…beyond the point of education. (175-176)      
In this excerpt, the concept of material value is escribed onto the bodies of Sethe and her children, 
which displays the objectivity of enslaved Black bodies. As Moten expresses, “The history of 
blackness is a testament to the fact that objects can and do resist” (1), and Sethe is that history, that 
testament made monstrous flesh. Her killing her child and seemingly killing the rest of her progeny 
classifies her as “wild” and “beyond the point of education” and her material value is nothing 
worth claiming in the eyes of the slave economy, because historically the reproductive qualities of 
enslaved women was of important value. As Angela Davis states in Women, Race, and Class:  
When the abolition of the international slave trade began to threaten the expansion 
of the young cotton-growing industry, the slaveholding class was forced to rely on 
natural reproduction as the surest method of replenishing and increasing the 
domestic slave population. Thus, a premium was placed on the slave woman’s 
reproductive capacity…Ideological exaltation of motherhood—as popular as it was 
during the nineteenth-century—did not extend to slaves. In fact, in the eyes of the 
slaveholders, slave women were not mothers at all; they were simply instruments 
guaranteeing the growth of the slave labor force. They were “breeders”—animals, 
whose monetary value could be precisely calculated in terms of their ability to  
multiply their numbers. (6-7)                
To Davis’ point, Sethe was only seen as a slave girl “with at least ten breeding years left” (176); 
yet, in the act of choosing to commit infanticide, Sethe rejects and denies the futurity of the slave 
production complex. In Althusserian terms, Sethe disrupts “the ultimate condition of production 
[which is] the reproduction of the conditions of production” (85). The cycle of (re)production of 
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slavery Sethe denies is both a radical act of subjectivity, which is the transition from “a 
dispossessive force [that] objects exert such that the subject seems to be possessed…by the object” 
(Moten, 1), and “an oppositional world view, a consciousness, an identity, a standpoint that exists 
not only as that struggle which also opposes dehumanization but as that movement which enables 
creative, expansive self-actualization” (hooks, 19). Sethe does the radical act of taking her fate into 
her own hands and embodying a new radical form of motherhood, Black motherhood, and a new 
form of radical form of subjectivity, a monstrous Black radical subjectivity. It is a subjectivity that 
indicates a queer futurity, a Black futurity, that exists outside the confining (con)textualization of 
the plantation.  
 This concept of Sethe embodying a radical, Black, monstrous subjectivity is reified by her 
own retelling of the events. The narrator’s retelling is significant because the narrator gives agency 
to Sethe in the telling of the narrative. This is one of many instances where Sethe is given 
ownership of her own narrative and out of this claiming, a unique phenomenon of temporality 
occurs. When recounting the event to a former slave from Sweet Home and her current lover, Paul 
D, the narrator states: 
What she wanted for her children was exactly what was missing in 124: safety. He 
thought he made it safe, had gotten rid of the danger; beat the shit out of it; run it 
off the place and showed it and everybody else the difference between the mule and 
the plow. And because she had not done it before he got there her own self, he 
thought it was because she could not do it. That she oved with 124 in helpless, 
apologetic resignation because she had no choice…he was wrong. This here Sethe 
was new…This here Sethe talked about love like any other woman, but what she 
meant could cleave bone. This here Sethe talked about safety with a hacksaw. This 
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here Sethe didn’t know where the world stopped and where she began…it scared 
him. (193)   
This radical reframing of the scene of subversion is a (re)production of the scene of subversion 
which underscores Sethe’s new power of choice and her new positionality as radical, Black, 
monstrous subject. She rejects the objectified positionality of “breeder” and instead performs a 
radical act of motherhood and has the ability to perform again, thus solidifying a sense of black 
futurity of Black motherhood. She rejects the futurity of the franchise of chattel slavery and reifies 
the futurity of the Black subject, a subject who occupies space outside of the constraints of white 
patriarchal hegemony. She shows the difference between giving birth and “having” children and 
the transformative and liberating power of such a delineation. Also, a detail that is significant to 
note in this scene is the imagery evoked by a blood soaked Sethe. Like Madeline Usher, Sethe 
embodies the form of the monstrous feminine with her clothes soaked in her child’s blood in a 
form of monstrous birth. Out of the violence and pain of this scene comes “this here new Sethe” 
as well as the ghost of Beloved, a ghost whose own positionality as hauntingly present is also 
indicative of a queer Black futurity as well as historicity. As Kristen Lillvis states in Posthuman 
Blackness and the Black Female Imagination: 
Beloved’s identity extends beyond this single time and this single child: she 
embodies the “Sixty Million and more” captive Africans who died before they 
reached the shores of America (Clemons 75), as well as those who survived the 
Middle Passage to join the generations of the enslaved (O’Reilly 87; Horwitz 157; 
Bouson 152). In the realm of Morrison’s novel, Sethe’s mother, a woman who died 
a violent death on the plantation where she was enslaved, must be included in this 
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number, which means that Beloved represents not only the unnamed millions who 
suffered because of slavery but, for Sethe, both child and mother. (13-14)  
Also, the reiteration and variation of the very first line of the novel, “124 was full of spite, [full] 
of a baby’s venom” (3), is indicative of Moten’s concept of the “on going (re)production of that 
performance in all its guises and for a critical awareness of how each of those guises is always 
already present in and disruptive of the supposed originarity of that prial scene” (4). All of these 
instances of the mundane performance and the normalization of Beloved’s haunting is essentially 
a reproduction of the primal scene which made her spectral to begin with, as well as the historical 
violence inflicted upon enslaved Black bodies, including Sethe’s own mother. Therefore, within 
Beloved, is the queer Black futurity and historicity that was only created out of Sethe’s act of  
radical, monstrous, motherly love.  
 
Conclusion: What About Our Future? 
The conceptualization and subsequent identification of monstrous subjectivity as a 
biproduct of the scene of subversion in the horror genre unveils a practice of reading that I believe 
to be key to any future discourse of the horror genre. The practice is one of radical, critical reading, 
a practice I have deployed in the investigation and identification of a radical, new form of 
subjectivity and queer futurity that is a key function of the monstrous in horror through the 
examples of Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher,” James’ The Turn of the Screw, and Morrison’s 
Beloved.  Why is radical critical reading so important to the future of discourse of the horror genre? 
This practice is important because it points to a lack of understanding of the monstrous as we know 
it, because for too long the locus of the discourse of the monstrous has been dependent on 
hegemonic power: What are the implications of what we fear? What do our fears represent? How 
have societies made the monsters we see? This mode of questioning gives too much power back 
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to the oppressive structure. Instead, I believe it is more transformative and liberating to actually 
position the reader as the devil’s advocate and see the monster for how revolutionary it is. This 
moves away from fetishizing the position of oppression as well as away from centering Power as 
the lens of critique. Viewing the monstrous from this positionality is a project of the ego and 
perpetuates the colonization of the body of the monster. This sentiment is also indicative of the 
intent behind my organization of texts from Poe to Morrison, because this progression is not only 
chronological, but it also becomes more intersectional and more indicative of what needs to be 
centered when analyzing such radical forms of subjectivity, concepts of liberation, and the voices 
necessary at the center of the discourse.  In the words of Audre Lorde in “The Master’s Tools Will 
Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” “Advocating the mere tolerance of difference…is the 
grossest reformism. It is a total denial of the creative function of difference in our lives. Difference 
must be not merely tolerated but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity 
can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening” 
(111).  The monster is less our “child” asking why we have created it and more so a creation of 
itself that is demanding radical epistemological change.   
In the face of such a demand for radical epistemological change, it is only logical to then 
ask: what does this mean for our future? Well, if and when the master’s house is dismantled, 
something new needs to be constructed in its place. Such ideological work is certainly supposed 
to be a unified effort, but not one that centers positionalities that were at the intersections of power 
in the master’s house. This process of creating a new ideology, a possible reparative ideology, is a 
process of healing for those who, generationally, have had their futurity affected by oppression. 
As utopian as it sounds, whatever the work of liberation entails, what is certain is that the 
movement cannot center or be led by the oppressor. If that is the case, then why does the monster 
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demand such radical epistemological change only to receive the same oppression just slightly 
different in flavor? Radical work is a necessity in order to do restorative work, and in some cases, 
they are in tandem, which is the power of affecting futurity. By denying, rejecting, or assuring a 
reproductive futurity, be it ideological reproduction or sexual reproduction or both, the monstrous 
is able to configure the text and the understanding of the text. This move is both a political move 
and a move necessary for the impact of the monstrous to be substantial. There is nothing more 
terribly, beautifully, impactful to a sensibility that desires and projects an illusion of safety and 
comfort than utter destruction, haunting ambiguity, and graphic, violent resistance, all of which 
the horror genre has a wealth of in the archive and, with it, many more iterations and scenes of 
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